It has frequently been noted that the eurozone crisis has also been a crisis of European identity, 1 and has provoked a general increase in Euroscepticism in public opinion across the EU (Serricchio et al. 2013) reflected in the unprecedented success of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections (BBC 2014) and the increased participation of Eurosceptic parties in government (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2013). A central theme of this book is that Euroscepticism is on the increase in Britain, as evidenced by the rise of UKIP (BBC 2014) and David Cameron's pledge to hold an in/out referendum on EU membership. In contrast, Schmidt (2012), for instance, suggests that, at least early in the economic crisis, Britain had acted as a leader in the EU, shedding its traditional role as the EU's 'awkward partner'.
In this way, traditional British Euroscepticism can be explained by the dominant discourse on state and nation. In particular, a pragmatic, rather than an emotional or identity-based approach to European integration has been prevalent in elite British discourse on the EU, which, as a result of the importance of Parliamentary sovereignty in the dominant discourse on state and nation, has often expressed fear of the loss of this sovereignty to a developing European 'superstate'. In this context, then, by examining Conservative and Labour discourse on the Eurozone crisis, particularly those of the leaders and Chancellor of the Exchequer and Shadow Chancellor, the chapter aims to evaluate whether the Eurozone crisis has acted as a catalyst for discursive change, a 'critical juncture', in provoking a fundamental shift in the dominant British discourse on the EU.
Foreign policy discourse analysis: An overview of British discourse on state, nation and the EU
Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis is a form of discourse analysis developed by authors including Waever (2002, 2005) and Larsen (1997 Larsen ( , 1999 on the basis of Foucault's approach to discourse. For Foucault, discourses organize knowledge systematically and delimit what can be said and what cannot; the aim of discourse analysis is, therefore, to look for these rules (Waever 2002, p. 29) . In this view, while discourses can change, they rarely do so radically; a change in discourse is rarely a complete change of discourse (Larsen 1997, p. 17) .
Following Foucault, therefore, discourse is seen as forming a system which is made up of a layered constellation of key concepts related in a hierarchical way, 'like a tree with roots, trunks and branches ' (Larsen 1997, p. 17) . In the context of foreign policy, then, the underlying national discourse on state and nation acts as 'a constraint that shapes the foreign policy of this state, a kind of framework within which the foreign policy of a particular country can take place ' (Larsen 1997, p. 21) . Thus, whatever their ulterior motives, policy makers must justify their policies in terms of how they resonate with the state's vision of itself (Waever 2002, p. 29) .
The idea that elite attitudes towards EU integration have a countryspecific dimension is backed up by the IntUne elites survey (Best 2012, pp. 234-241) (Gaxie and Hubé 2013, p. 178) . In this context, nationality appears to be a more significant variable in determining elites' attitudes towards the EU than either ideological leaning or personal background (Gaxie and Hubé 2013, pp. 177-178) .
